Contents: 
Theory of the firm
Transaction costs
Market structures
Perfect competition
Monopolies
Cartels
Rent seeking
Effects of economic regulations
Market design
Contestable markets
Sharing economy
Intellectual property
The principal-agent problem
Information asymmetry
Price discrimination
Vertical integration
Game theory
Research and development

Recommended reading: 
Jean Tirole, 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
J. Church, R. Ware, 2000, Industrial Organization, The McGraw-Hill.
R. Schmalensee, R. Willig, 1989, Handbook of Industrial Organization, North Holland: Amsterdam.
R. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4 (16): 386–405, 1937, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x.
R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1): 1–44, 1960, doi: 10.1086/466560.
William J. Baumol, John C. Panzar, & Robert D. Willig (1982). Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure.
F. Hayek, “Competition as a discovery procedure”,
D. T. Armentano, Antitrust: The Case of Repeal, 1999, Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute
M. Boldrin, D. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, 2008,
A. Roth: Who Gets What and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design, 2015, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.
G. Tullock, 1967, “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft”, Western Economic Journal, 5 (3): 224–32, doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x.
O. E. Williamson, 1981, “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach”, The American Journal of Sociology, 87 (3): 548–577.