relies more than most legal systems for its effectiveness on intangible factors. High among these intangibles is its overall credibility. What will happen to that credibility when the human rights movement has clearly failed? I suggest that the main effect of the universal human rights movement will be a seriously diminished credibility for international law. This will be no less a loss because it is the product of impeccable intentions.

INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: EFFECTIVENESS AND ALTERNATIVES

*by Dinah Shelton**

During the past 30 years, the international community has proceeded from the initial step of accepting a basic legal obligation to respect and promote observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, through a necessary stage of codification and enumeration of the rights to be protected, to recent efforts to provide implementation mechanisms essential to a realization of the rights recognized.

That an obligation has been created and accepted can scarcely be doubted at this point. Without the necessity of once again debating the legal status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this obligation finds articulation in the U.N. Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Communities, the Charter of the Council of Europe, and other basic constitutional texts of intergovernmental organizations. It is, I think, fair to state that no general international organization exists that does not contain within its basic constituting document an obligation on the part of member states to work for the promotion and protection of internationally recognized human rights.

This obligation is also reflected in state practice, where governments routinely discuss the human rights situation within other countries and where states' behavior in international forums reflects acceptance of the existence of a human rights obligation. As early as 1949, immediately following adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in the so-called Russian Wives Case in which it declared that Soviet measures preventing Russian wives from leaving the Soviet Union with their foreign husbands were "not in conformity with the Charter," citing Articles 13 and 16 of the Declaration.[1] Investigations of alleged human rights violations have been undertaken in the past two years by international teams in regard to Chile, Southern Africa, Israel, Paraguay, El Salvador, Panama and Nicaragua, among others. While debate about the substance of the alleged violations is vociferous, complaints about intervention into domestic jurisdiction are heard with increasing infrequency and in almost pro forma terms.

Codification of human rights obligations essentially began with the Inter-American and Universal Declarations of Human Rights in 1948—although the work of the International Labour Organization (ILO) standard-setting truly initiated the international effort in 1919—and has

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[1]G.A. Res. 285, U.N. Doc. A/900, at 34-35 (1949).

continued through adoption of some 50 U.N. treaties, two major regional instruments, and more than 100 labor standards treaties of the ILO.

While this effort may not be complete, the past decade has seen major attention turn to the question of implementing the catalog of basic human rights proclaimed in international instruments. Enforcement has always been seen as the weak link in international law, to the point of providing an argument to some that it does not exist. There are at least two bases on which disagreement with this negative approach can rest: one is with the factual premise that enforcement does not—or cannot—occur; the other is opposition to the narrow conceptual approach to law which premises its existence on the availability of a police force to sanction lawbreakers. It is primarily to the first point—the existence and efficacy of international human rights procedures—that this paper is addressed.

On the question of efficacy, two cautions must be made regarding the tentative nature of any conclusions. First, it must be emphasized that none of these procedures—nor indeed the substantive human rights law on which they are based—is more than 30 years old, again with the exception of the ILO. Some of the procedures have been in effect less than five years, and most less than ten years. How effective they are now, if that can be measured, will tell us little, if anything, about how effective they may be in another 30 years. By way of illustration, had one looked at implementation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution some 30 years after its enactment into law, conclusions on both its substance and implementation would have produced very pessimistic evaluations about its role in remedying racial discrimination in the United States.

The second factor affecting any effort to assess the effectiveness of international procedures concerns causality. It is often difficult to prove that alleviation of the human rights situation in a given context is directly attributable to the existence of international implementation machinery. Governments have been known to improve human rights to foreclose implementation organs from undertaking public investigations or condemnation, in effect, mooting the quesion. While this results in a change for the better, it oftens leaves no record of the link between the mechanism and change. Much quiet pressure resulting in human rights enforcement occurs because of the availability of regularized compliance procedures. Thus, we may never know how much better the human rights situation is because of the existence of existing procedures—or how much worse it might have been without them.

Further, no comprehensive study has ever been done on changes in the laws and practice of states resulting from international human rights procedures; evidence is available—piecemeal, vastly better in some organizations than others, in all cases in need of compilation and evaluation.

Bearing in mind, then, the short period of time about which we are speaking and the difficulty of assessing causality in many cases, what are the available human rights implementation procedures and how effective are they?

We may distinguish four types of procedures, based upon the character of the instigating party: self-reporting by the state, interstate complaint procedures, individual petition procedures, and ad hoc investigations launched by organs of international organizations. All of these procedures should be viewed as supplementary and supervisory, since primary responsibility for

enforcing international human rights norms continues to rest with each state.

Reporting Procedures.

The presentation of state reports to an international authority is a procedure commonly utilized to oversee implementation of international human rights. It is a long-standing practice, found in the League of Nations and the Constitution of the ILO as well as in the Charter of the United Nations (Article 64).

The experience of the ILO has shown that state reports can effectively monitor implementation of human rights conventions. The ILO Constitution requires that states which have ratified labor conventions of the organization submit periodic reports on implementation. These reports are examined by a special Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions, consisting of independent persons appointed by the Governing Body of the ILO. Employers' and workers' organizations receive copies of the reports and may comment on them. The reports and findings of the Committee of Experts are submitted to governments and to the International Labour Conference, in its Committee on the Application of Conventions. This committee is composed of representatives of governments, employers and workers, thus providing for evaluation by nongovernmental officials.[2]

Within the United Nations, reports on subjects such as political rights for women and measures to implement the granting of independence to colonial peoples have been requested at various times through resolutions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), beginning as early as 1949. Most important, however, has been the establishment of a system of periodic reporting on human rights matters, adopted in 1956 by ECOSOC on a recommendation of the Commission on Human rights.[3] Under procedures revised in 1965, this system now requires states to submit reports in a three-year cycle on (a) civil and political rights; (b) economic, social and cultural rights; and, (c) on freedom of information.[4]. These reports, together with information solicited from the specialized agencies, are forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on the Status of Women and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.

The 1965 procedure also invites nongovernmental organizations in consultative status to submit comments and observations on human rights situations to be forwarded along with state reports to the organs mentioned. In turn the Human Rights Commission is authorized to establish, as it has done, a committee on periodic reports having as its mandate the study and evaluation of the periodic reports and submission to the Commission of comments, conclusions and recommendations based upon them.

Apart from the U.N. Charter, a number of international human rights treaties require the communication of information by states parties. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, the Protocol of 1966, and the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless persons of 1954 all

[2]The European Social Charter of 18 October 1961 has a similar arrangement.
[3]Official Records, ECOSOC, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 7, paras. 135-41.
[4]ECOSOC Res. 1074 C (XXXIX) of 28 July 1965.

require states parties to communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application of the Convention concerned. Similarly, the series of Slavery Conventions require reports on implementing measures undertaken by states parties.

Under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the two Covenants, reporting mechanisms are more elaborate. The Racial Convention establishes a Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which receives reports on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which are adopted by states parti :o give effect to the Convention.

Like the Racial Convention, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes a Human Rights Committee with authority over the international aspects of implementing the Covenant. This Committee receives reports from states parties on measures taken to give effect to the provisions of the Covenant.

Under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the states parties undertake to submit to the Economic and Social Council "reports on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized" in the Covenant. The Economic and Social Council has established a system of biennial reports for various parts of the Covenant, and decided to establish a sessional working group to assist in the consideration of state reports. It was also decided that states parties to the Covenant will henceforth be excused from submitting periodic reports under the 1965 procedure for those matters covered by the Covenant.

Because of general criticism of the reporting system as a measure of implementation it is worth examining the work of the Human Rights Committee established by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. First, the Committee itself is composed of 18 members serving in their individual capacities, nominated and elected by the states parties to the Covenant. The independence of Committee members is stressed in number of provisions of the Covenant. These committee members, first elected when the Covenant and Optional Protocol went into effect in 1976, review state reports submitted pursuant to article 40 of the Covenant.

Article 40 requires states parties to file reports on (1) measures they have adopted, including legislative or judicial action, which give effect to the rights recognized within the Covenant; (2) progress made in the enjoyment of those rights; and (3) the factors and difficulties encountered in giving them effect. The first reports are due within one year of the entry into force of the Covenant for each state party.

In its rules of procedure for the consideration of state reports, the Committee has emphasized its supervisory function: it establishes the form and guidelines for contents of state reports; any state representative present when his state's report is submitted is expected to "be able to answer questions which may be put to him by the Committee and make statements on reports already submitted by his state and also submit additional information." In practice the Committee has never examined the report of a state unless a representative of the state concerned was present. This practice was instituted in spite of objections by one member of the Committee that it amounted to an "investigatory procedure."

The Committee has drafted guidelines for state reports which, in two parts, require extensive information on domestic implementation of the substantive provisions of the Covenant. Among the matters requested: the legislative, administrative or other measures in force in regard to each right; any restrictions or limitations imposed by law or practice on the enjoyment of each right; and, any other factors or difficulties affecting the enjoyment of the rights. The objective, as stated in the guidelines, is to develop a "constructive dialogue" between the reporting state party and the Committee.

The Committee's rules require that in consideraion of state reports, the Committee should first determine that all requested information has been provided, and solicit additional information where it is determined that omissions have occured. Once all necessary information is obtained, the Committee may then examine the report and if it determines that some of the obligations of that state party under the covenant have not been discharged, may make such general comments as it considers appropriate. Where states fail to provide adequate information, this fact may be relayed to the General Assembly.

The Committee has also made informal use of outside information in reviewing state reports, in spite of the lack of explicit authorization in the Covenant for such a practice, and overriding objections within the Committee itself. Even without formalized procedures, then, both specialized agencies and nongovernmental agencies have been able to supply information to Committee members. In addition, with regard to one outside source, the Committee has made official use of available information. In the case of Chile, the Committee took notice of General Assembly resolutions and reports of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile of the United Nations. The result was a request to Chile to file a new report, based on the stated conclusion that the first report did not reflect the realities of the human rights situation in that country.

The Committee's power to make recommendations and to follow up on state reports is limited. The Committe's mandate is to study the reports submitted and draw up a report, together with general comments that it considers appropriate. These are to be transmitted to states parties and may be transmitted to ECOSOC. In practice, the Committee may use its power to make general comments to draw attention to situations which it considers incompatible with obligations arising under the Covenant. Since the Committee has only been in effect for five sessions, it is too soon to determine how extensive its use may be of this ability.

State compliance with reporting procedures is generally extensive, though, one may legitimately complain, self-serving. It is the self-serving nature of state reports that make other aspects of the procedure crucial to its effectiveness. To be effective, a reporting system should provide for an independent review committee with the ability to obtain and use outside information from independent sources. The Committee should be authorized to comment on inadequate or inaccurate reporting, and, ultimately, there must be provisions for publication of Committee evaluations of compliance based on both state reports and supplemental information. These factors are by and large present in the best procedures—although all could be improved—and lead to the question of whether, even if all are found, the reporting procedure can be an effective measure of implementation.

There is little information on measures taken by states to improve human rights in response to reporting procedures. However, there is some evidence that the most developed of the procedures, those of the ILO the U.N. Racial convention, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, have had and do have an impact on state practice in regard to human rights. A study done by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1978 (A/CONF.92/8, 19 April 1978) on progress made toward the achievement of the objectives of the Convention, found that during its first eight years significant improvement in legislative, administrative and judicial practices occurred among states parties. Some Constitutions were amended; others states undertook systematic review of their legislation, with a view toward eliminating racially discriminatory laws; others established new administrative agencies to deal with problems of racial discrimination. Further, in many cases, states parties formally acknowledged that such changes were introduced into their legal or administrative systems in response to pressure from the Committee in reviewing state reports. In a few instances, states parties consulted the Committee in advance of proposed changes to request Committee advice. The ILO has similar documentation on its history of state reporting.

While it is too early to determine whether the Human Rights Committee under the covenant will have such an impact, its work thus far leads one to be optimistic.

Thus, while reporting procedures may be slow and cumbersome, the existence of the factors cited above may allow their continued use and development as an effective, if inherently limited, measure of implementation.

Interstate Procedures.

In a number of international human rights agreements on both universal and regional levels, a state party is permitted to institute complaints or communications against another state party said not to be fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. Such interstate procedures exist within the ILO, the European and Inter-American conventions, the U.N. Racial Convention, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This procedure is not widely favored, nor, for that reason, frequently used. In the case of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it has come into effect only recently, with the deposit on the tenth declaration in March 1979.

Objections to interstate complaint procedures center upon fears of the misuse of such procedures for political motivations. The infrequency of complaints may be seen to reflect the seriousness with which states treat this procedure. While political motivation may exist as some part of a state's reason for bringing a complaint, analysis of those few cases brought thus far does not bear out the fears of its detractors. Other objections focus upon the adversarial posture of the proceedings, and fears of disrupting otherwise friendly relations between states. There is also perhaps some concern about too close a look at the complaining state's own human rights situation.

For all these reasons, interstate procedures are rarely used, and this is their major weakness. As noted, the Covenant procedure has come into force only recently. The procedures of the Racial Convention and the Inter-

American Convention have produced no cases thus far, while the ILO has had few interstate complaints in its 60-year history, the first being filed more than 40 years after the procedure came into existence.

The case law of the European Convention then provides the bulk of evidence on the use of interstate mechanisms to enforce human rights.

Within the European system, there have been 13 interstate complaints condensed into five fact groupings: two cases brought by Greece against the United Kingdom, concerning Cyprus (1956-57); Austria v. Italy over the rights of German-speaking citizens of northern Italy (1960); five cases filed against Greece by the Nordic countries (1967, 1970); two cases by Ireland against the United Kingdom over Northern Ireland (1971, 1972); and three cases brought by Cyprus against Turkey over Turkish activities in Cyprus (1974, 1975, 1977).

With what result? Do interstate complaints have a salutary effect on human rights? The evidence here is certainly unclear, although it seems fair to say that in some of the European cases—by no means all—improvements in human rights within states complained against were tied to the initiation of interstate proceedings. However, given the reluctance of states to bring human rights enforcement actions and the mixed results thus far, interstate complaints cannot be seen as a major method of implementation at this point.

Petition procedures

If reporting procedures are often self-serving and interstate complaints too political to implement human rights fully and effectively, where do we turn? To many, the obvious answer is to the victim. Individuals and groups—actual or potential victims—have the greatest interest in ensuring respect for human rights and can be expected to be active and diligent in their defense.

There currently exist six major international petition forums available for victims, their friends, and their lawyers. There is considerable variation in the objectives and procedures of the petition systems, but they all share the virtue of being open to initiation by nongovernmental entities.

Virtually every state in the world is bound to one form of petition procedure or another, and thus is open to denunciation by those subjected to human rights violations. Currently, human rights advocates may choose from the following:

(1) The United Nations. Although a few specialized procedures remain for trusteeship and colonial territories—in the former case explicitly sanctioned in the Charter—major attention has turned to two recently developed procedures within the United Nations.

(a) 1503: In order to strengthen the means available to the United Nations to implement human rights, ECOSOC, in resolution 1235 (XLII) of 1967, authorized its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and protection of Minorities (the Sub-Commission) to examine information received from individuals pursuant to an earlier resolution (728F). This procedure was strengthened in 1970 by ECOSOC Res. 1503 (XLIII). The importance of the resolution is demonstrated by the fact that examination of communications within the United Nations is generally referred to as the 1503 procedure. Implementation of the procedure is the function of the Sub-Commission and the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

(b) Detainees and Disappeared Persons: Since 1973, the Human Rights Commission has considered the question of treatment of prisoners, authorizing the Sub-Commission in 1974 "to review annually developments in the field." As part of this review, the Sub-Commission may consider "any reliably attested information" from, among others, nongovernmental organizations. This procedure developed from the fact that a great number of communications were received alleging violations of the human rights of detainees. The Sub-Commission has gradually expanded its mandate. In May 1979, ECOSOC by resolution 1979/38, requested the Sub-Commission to consider communications on disappeared persons. Under this authorization, a working group was established in March 1980 to examine questions relevant to forced or involuntary disappearances of persons.

(2) The Human Rights Committee: States Parties which ratify the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights thereby authorize the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider individual communications from persons alleged to be victims of human rights violations committed by a ratifying state.

(3) International Labour Organization: Articles 24 and 25 of the ILO Constitution enable employers' or workers' organizations to make a formal "representation" to the ILO that a member state has not effectively observed the provisions of a ratified convention. Representations are considered first by a three-member committee of the Governing Body, then by the Governing Body itself.

(4) UNESCO: In 1977, the Executive Board of UNESCO authorized consideration of individual communications within the spheres of its competence, based largely on earlier U.N. procedures.[5]

(5) The European Commission and Court: The European Convention provides a highly developed system of individual communications under an optional provision generally accepted by states parties to the Convention.

(6) Inter-American Commission and Court: With the convention on Human Rights now in force, there are an almost bewildering variety of procedures for consideration of individual communications, depending upon whether the Convention, or the Statute of the Commission under the authority of the OAS Charter is invoked. New regulations were recently adopted which should simplify the system.

It also should be noted that the Racial Convention provides a right of petition under an optional provision, but it has not gone into effect due to insufficient acceptance.

Without going into the details of admissibility and procedure, a number of common elements and distinctive features of the various procedures can be pointed out.

Objectives

While all of the procedures are intended to improve human rights situations, specific approaches differ considerably. Three of the systems are designed to grant individual relief: the European procedure can and does result in monetary damages being awarded a victim of a violation, but at the

[5]77EX-Decision 8.3.

moment it is unique in that regard, although both the Optional Protocol and the Inter-American Convention are addressed to individual victims.

By way of constrast the U.N. 1503 procedure authorizes study of situations which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and is not for redress of individual violations. Similarly, the procedures of the ILO focus on state-wide patterns of violation rather than individual cases. UNESCO has decided to look both at "cases" and questions"—*i.e.*, individual and systematic violations, as has the Inter-American system.

Standing

Initiation of the procedures is restricted to victims in the Human Rights Committee, the European Commission and the Inter-American Convention Procedure. The ILO restricts complaints to employers' or workers' associations under Article 24. In all other procedures disinterested parties, specifically nongovernmental organizations, may file petitions or communications initiating the procedures. In every case the author of the petition must be identified, and there are common provisions on exhaustion of domestic remedies, timeliness, and abusive or offensive petitions.

Subject matter

Although the 1503 procedure is concerned with all internationally recognized human rights, each of the other procedures limits the subject matter which may be considered by the implementing organ. Those pursuant to specific human rights treaty are limited to the rights recognized in the treaty. Those established by specialized agencies, such as UNESCO, are limited by the competence of the agnecy.

Implementing organ

Both regional systems and the Optional Protocol establish special organs to consider individual communications. The United Nations has authorized existing organs to consider communications, as has UNESCO.

Consideration and follow-up

All of the procedures attempt to avoid the appearance of an adversarial system, primarily, it would appear, from a desire to avoid placing state and individual on an equal basis in an international forum. For this reason, the term "communication" is preferred to the more judicial "petition" or "complaint". All possible procedural guarantees are afforded states, including secrecy in some cases, and the role of individuals in the system, once the communication is filed, is generally minimal. However, outside the U.N. procedures, all systems allow for consideration of the communications by independent experts rather than governmental officials, freeing decision-making from the political considerations which have hampered the 1503 procedure at the level of the Human Rights Commission. The impact of vesting authority outside governmental officials can be easily seen in a comparision of the number of 1503 cases reported out by the independent Sub-Commission—some 20—and the number of cases on which the governmental Commission has taken some form of action—two.

Results and evaluation

It is very difficult to provide a single assessment of this variety of procedures. Some work vastly better than others and can truly be said to provide a remedy for past violations and prevention of future ones. In this regard, the regional systems have proved themselves thus far of greater effectiveness than U.N. models, although the work of the Human Rights Committee show great promise. Thus far, its admissibility rate on communications—35 percent—and the speed with which it has concluded consideration of those petitions presented to it are improvements even on the European system.

Effectiveness is more easily measured where the procedures are designed to give individual relief, *e.g.* where it can be verified if the communicating individual has been released from prison or permitted to publish a newspaper. Systematic changes are more difficult to measure, and results from the 1503 procedure are thus less readily identifiable. It is known in one case, however, that a government declared a general amnesty one day prior to consideration of its situation by the Commission. Under the circumstances of the cases, the causal link seemed apparent.

As with the reporting and interstate procedures, then, it appears that implementation does occur, although the situation could certainly be improved. With international organizations now receiving between 60,000 and 70,000 communications a year, there is major work to be done, including settling issues of competing or coexisting procedures.

Ad hoc investigations

On occasion international organizations determine that human rights violations in a particular county warrant study; it will then establish an investigating committee or appoint a special rapporteur to evaluate the situation. The United Nations has done this in recent years with regard to Southern Africa (1967), Israel (1969), and Chile (1975). The Inter-American Commission has made much more extensive use of investigations in its human rights work, in 1978 alone making on-site inspections of El Salvador, Haiti and Nicaragua and receiving reports on earlier investigations of Panama, Uraguay and Paraguay.

The ability to make such investigations function fully requires the cooperation of the subject state, since on-site inspections are important if not essential. The response of states to such requests has varied. Chile is illustrative. An Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile was established by the U.N. Human Rights Commission in 1975 for the purpose of inquiring into the human rights situation in Chile and reporting to the General Assembly and the Commission. From 1975 to 1977 the group sought permission to enter Chile, which was denied. Reports of the Group for those years were based upon evidence obtained from those coming out of Chile. An agreement was finally reached with the Government in 1978, and the group visited in July of that year. At that time it had more than 300 written requests from individuals and groups wishing to appear before it. It visited prisons, churches, hospitals and political centers, making a final report to the Commission in late 1978.

The results of such investigations vary. Again in Chile the reports of the Committee show findings of an improvement in the human rights situation

since the Committee began to function, although repression by no means has ended. One interesting fact shows that on a list of 1000 disappeared persons presented to the Group, all but eight cases had occurred before the end of 1976, when the Group, made its first report. Further, an amnesty was declared in April 1978, prior to the first on-site investigation by the group, and involved the release from prison of a large number of individuals. In regard to the Inter-American investigation of Panama, the government responded to the reported findings by making changes in the juridical structure and forwarding notice of these to the Inter-American Commission.

Conclusion

What this broad overview of human rights procedures has attempted to show is that there are now in effect mechanisms for implementation of human rights. There are others which there has been no time to discuss: preparation of studies, technical assistance programs, and educational programs undertaken by international and regional organizations. Moreover, states respond—albeit in varying degrees—to these procedures, are concerned to avoid being found in violation of substantive human rights norms, and generally show an awareness and acceptance of an international human rights obligation. What is perhaps most surprising, given the procedural hurdles and conservatism inherent in these systems, is that they work as well as they do.

We still haven't solved the problem of the Ugandas and Cambodias, and under current procedures we may not be able to. Then, again, it is hard to predict the evolution of these systems over the next 30 years. The system is flawed, and there are law-breakers who function without effective sanction: this is also the case in many domestic legal systems. We do have rather extensive evidence of situations where states have altered their laws and practices in response to one or another of these international enforcement procedures. Thus, I would say, we are better off than we would be without the range of implementing mechanisms we have.

Finally, it is important to recognize the inherent limitations in the legal system we are developing. In this country, one lesson that should be taken from the civil rights movement is that while the law may reduce or ideally eliminate racial discrimination, it is not capable of curing racism. Law can and should affect and sanction manifestations of intolerance and injustice. It is asking it to do a job for which it is not equipped to demand that it also remove the fundamental causes of intolerance and injustice. Those lie within the domains of politics, sociology, psychology and religion. Ulitmately to achieve a just world the task will require bringing all of these disciplines to bear on human rights problems. In the meantime, lawyers must continue to work to build a legal foundation for a humanitarian order.